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To quote myself, "ultimately, political parties are for governing."^
Or are they? Under a minimal definition of parties the claim holds.
What else are parties if not the quintessential mechanism for legal
access to public office under conditions of mass democracy? But let
us take a more ambitious definition of parties: one that looks at
them as the main force affecting and therefore changing, when in power,
what governments latu sensu do. It takes little to see that the
definition no longer holds. What we have is no longer a definition
but a hypothesis that admits variance: the fact of parties in
government does not secure party government (not in the ambitious 
2sense above). I would venture further, and suggest that even when 
held as an ideal state, approached only in varying degrees by concrete 
parties, party government, unless scaled down to sense variation, holds 
little discriminant value.
Consider the following. If party government must entail no less
than clear party preeminence over the affairs of the state, then Richard
Rose is right in asserting that "only in a totalitarian society would
3
one expect party government to reign absolutely." It takes a party 
that incorporates the whole, in fact, a party that coincides with the 
state itself ... to run the state. If on the other hand, parties are 
parts— components of a plural system of parties, itself formally distinct 
from decisional institutions— then Rose is again right in pointing 
how factually absurd (and normatively dangerous) it is to expect that 
a change in the governing parties will unilaterally achieve what party 




























































































the previous government did. No democracy that intends to reproduce 
itself can and does tolerate such level of uncertainty. The only sure 
thing that a new governing party changes is party-appointed government 
personnel. Almost unheard of is the case in which parties regularly 
replacing each other in government routinely change significant facets 
of the political or socioeconomic structure. Though there are and have 
been a few democracies whose parties do not see eye-to-eye on many 
constitutional and structural matters, there have been fewer that have 
witnessed and none that has long withstood repeated rotations among 
such parties. More likely and tolerable is the case of parties 
coming into government with alternative sets of specific policies.**
Yet, even here the distinctiveness of party platforms, the ability 
of governing parties to fulfill their pledges, as well as their ability 
to leave a significant partisan imprint over and above that of permanent 
bureaucracies and organized societal interests, are more often than 
not below the expectations of the party government model. And if we 
go by expectations, even the British party system, long considered the 
model's prototype, would not strictly fit it.**
To rescue the concept of party government for comparative purposes 
we must relax its most onerous requirements and expectations; something 
which, for the purposes of this essay, I can do by a mere sleight of 
hand: by advancing the banal truth that parties do make "some" difference
after all, and in some cases more than others. The question I am now in 
the position to address in the essay is how much of a difference parties 




























































































are two sides to the question: how much party government any partic­
ular system is capable of mustering; how much it can actually afford.
The first side of the question is about instrumentalities. It takes
party government as the proper arrangement for processing popular
demands and holding government to accountability, and only inspects the ways and
means to secure it. It is a side of party government which appears at first
of the greatest relevance nowadays, when an alleged loss of party control
over public policies in favor of other bureaucratic or societal agencies
raises issues in many minds about democratic representativeness.
But the more intriguing side of the party government question is 
in reality the second: If there are limits beyond which party govern­
ment may threaten instead of assisting democratic reproducibility 
(I will dwell on the term in the next section)— if, that is, the ultimate 
value is not party government but democratic reproducibility— exploring 
those normative-behavioral upper limits is a task integral to and in 
fact preliminary to the study of the instrumentalities for party 
government. For one thing, there have been democracies that have 
sacrificed the latter for the sake of reproducibility; others, on the 
contrary, have sought to enforce party government at great costs; and 
still other and luckier ones have reconciled party government with reproducibility 
without much of a serious problem. Why the difference? For another thing, thinking 
in terms of these differences sheds new light on today's alleged crisis
in the distinctiveness and incisiveness of party government.
In principle, there should be no serious reason to bemoan the 




























































































But does it? On one side, one is tempted to answer in the affirmative.
Seen in context, parties— whether in government or opposition— are 
collective legal/legitimate gatekeepers between societal interests and 
public institutions. It is this collective location straddling agencies 
of demand and agencies of performance that makes parties the key not 
only and obviously to party government but also and more broadly to 
reproducibility itself. Hence, whenever that collective location is 
challenged— as it has been in recent years— not only party government 
but reproducibility itself would appear at stake. On the other side,
I must emphasize that there isn't just one crisis but many crises, 
differently packaged in different places. It seems reasonable for 
example— and I will not for the moment elaborate on the statement—  
that democracies which never quite managed to reconcile party government 
with reproducibility, but were induced to sacrifice one or the other, 
have today a harder time (in different ways) redesigning party govern­
ment for the sake of reproducibility when they never managed to do it 
before.
It is now time for me to address the question of democratic 
reproducibility. To stress its exchange and market nature, I will 
contrast it to reproducibility in nondemocratic systems. This will 
be followed by an analysis of the difficulties encountered by new democracies 
in reconciling reproducibility with party government.
I will use examples from European democracies that have replaced 
authoritarian or totalitarian systems. I will conclude with party 





























































































REPRODUCING CONSENT: DEMOCRACIES AND NONDEMOCRACIES
Democracy is a matter of consent and consent, though often durable, 
does not come free. It must be reproduced. That is why, above, I have 
spoken of reproducibility rather than simply consent, legitimacy, or 
similar. Reproducibility begins to convey what it takes; the opera­
tional side of consent. I have also stated that the key to reproduci­
bility is the political party, or better, the system of parties.
Their plurality; the plurality of opinions and interests they variously 
transmit, mediate, package, and even deflect or label; their institutional 
separation from and yet their collective/competitive hold on government —  
these are the factors that explain why consent is required, why it does 
not come free, and why at the same time it is parties that ultimately 
reproduce consent (thus reproducing themselves) or arrest it.
By contrast, in a totalitarian or authoritarian regime the key 
agent of reproducibility is the state itself, or the party-state where 
it exists. This does not mean that matters of consent are
irrelevant. But it does mean that since consent does not depend on 
the uncertainties of the political market (the survival or revival of 
such market would in fact threaten consent) reproducibility is less of 
a problem. It also means that, where consent fails and a political 
market begins to stir, force is strictly speaking still sufficient to 
preserve a nondemocratic order^— as well as being justifiable in the 
light of some principle of organic unity inherent in that order. A 
democracy, however, extracts consent from a competitive political market—  
a more aleatory process requiring replication. If consent fails, a 
democracy cannot live on force alone without eventually putting into 




























































































it is finally less likely to muster force anyway, since ultimately 
support and sanction for its use must again come from a political market 
which is however naturally prone to fall further apart on the issue.
Besides, what is democratic consent about? To answer the question 
is to underscore once more the calculus that is behind it.
For consent is about the political market itself or nothing
else. More precisely it is about what Adam Przeworski calls uncertainty—
the uncertainty of political outcomes which naturally results from the
g
competitive market. Outcomes depend on resources or positions— both
politico/institutional and socioeconomic— and the presence of a political
market, by preventing a monopoly of the same, is meant to prevent fixed
and repetitive outcomes: winners always winning, losers always losing.
By preventing a monopoly of politico/institutional positions (and by
institutional dispersion), democracy for instance avoids one source of
certainty about outcomes and winners which is typical of totalitarian/
authoritarian regimes. At the same time, by legalizing equal access to
institutional positions, and by dispersing them in countervailing
fashion, democracy corrects as well the unequal effects of social and
economic positioning. It is the essence of political democracy that
no single social or institutional formation should determine outcomes by
monopolizing institutions (a class-party state) or by its sheer social
position (a laissez-faire capitalist class). But why should any group
prefer the uncertainty of democracy— more precisely, why should it consent
to be at times a loser? One answer is that consenting to lose is a




























































































However, the answer requires elaboration, for it is not the simple, 
rock-bottom, all-explaining answer that it sounds. To say that accepting 
to lose is a condition for winning is not to say that democracy is only 
the residual option, entered into by any collective actor if chances of 
winning all the time, that is under a. different political order, are 
limited. First of all, there are political actors today who enter into 
democracy's bargain implicitly; i.e., without a calculus of the feas­
ibility and personal advantages of other alternatives. For them the 
democratic bargain is a natural and appropriate bias.^ Second, even 
those political actors who may seem to us to be compelled toward 
democracy as a residual option may not always find or perceive the 
option as equally residual., unpalatable, and conditional: hence, the
range and consistency of consent will vary. To give flesh to this point 
it is sufficient to reflect on concrete cases of democratic inauguration, 
following a prolonged period of dictatorship, and the response by former 
members of dictatorial coalitions. They suggest that, given certain 
conditions, even its inner core may find dictatorship expendable and 
democracy something more than a temporary retrenchment. ^
There have been cases in which democracy materialized almost as an 
afterthought (the Second Spanish Republic), and cases in which it was 
inescapable (post-Nazi West Germany); cases in which the dictatorship 
remained largely cohesive to the bitter end (World War II Japan), and 
cases in which, by splitting, it put in motion democratization (post- 
Salazar Portugal); cases in which entering into the democratic 
bargain was necessary for the recognition, in some reformed way, of old 




























































































monarchy after Fascism), and cases in which those interests and 
formations might have survived at least in part without full democratization 
(Greece under the colonels); cases in which entering into the democratic 
bargain was sufficient (large sectors of the right after Franco), and 
cases in which it was not (the right after Primo de Rivera). If we 
combine these various possibilities we find therefore instances as disparate 
as the Second Spanish Republic and Spain after Franco. In the former, the 
old right— having survived and regrouped after Primo de Rivera's uneventful 
fall— looked at democracy as a residual option, and not even that compelling 
and unavoidable. It also looked at it as progressively unpalatable or 
at least conditional (incidentalismo described the attitude at the time), 
as the republican left moved to undercut the right's share in the democratic 
bargain beyond limits which the right considered crucial for its survival.
In post-Franco Spain, on the contrary, the process of democratization 
was initiated by forces inside the Franco coalition itself; and while 
the move was probably necessary to secure the recognition of old interests 
on new competitive grounds, it was also sufficient.
The implications of the two cases for the transfer of consent from 
one political order to another are rather simple: transfer, though by
no means easy, is at times possible. The fact of previous consent to 
a nondemocratic order is no necessary impediment. And though we may fear 
mental reservations in the attitude of social formations that turn 
toward democracy, the only thing we can firmly observe— and the only 
that counts for democratic reproducibility— are repetitive deeds: playing
by the adopted rules, hence sharing a probable amount of wins and 




























































































A further element of complexity in joining the democratic bargain
stems from the fact that there is a whole range of possibilities about
being a winner, or a loser, "some" of the time: How often is that?
It is clear that in setting up a political market this is a matter of
great contention among collective political actors. It is equally clear
that in an.open and competitive democracy the matter is not settled by
deciding ahead of time exactly how often, how much and when each actor
will win or lose. Rather, consent is upon a set of rules of the game:
norms, procedures, and institutions whose operation will probabilistically
and therefore still uncertainly effect a fair balance of winning and 
12losing. If rule agreement is reached, its institutional nature and the 
fact that it is only probabilistically related to outcomes mean that 
it can have a span of endurance. Still, the agreement is also instrumental, 
a mean to an end; and political actors, even when consenting outright 
to a share of losses and victories, try as much as possible to bend both 
means and ends in their favor. Therefore, agreement on rules is con­
tinuously though implicitly tested against performance and may at times 
require renegotiation if, for reasons having to do with the rules' actual 
operation or their changing environment, performance falls eventually 
outside a tolerable range of expected outcomes.
It seems, then, that when political parties are centrally involved
13in the inauguration of democracy, they have quite a task to attend to.
The demanding nature of the task is stressed by the fact that it is 
at this juncture that the issue of how much a democracy can afford in 




























































































SUCCESSOR DEMOCRACIES AND THE LIMITS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT14
Let us imagine, to start with, a set of parties which— by any 
number of acceptable criteria we employ— are committed unreservedly to 
the democratic bargain.^ Their commitment means that their first 
objective is to build the institutional and, through them, material 
conditions for reproducing consent on the broadest basis. At the same 
time, as parties prospectively competing for government, it is also 
their objective to try and carve the best possible deal for themselves 
and their followers. I have already pointed out the difficulties 
inherent in principle in reconciling the two objectives: both objectives
are pursued through institutional manipulation; but the latter points 
ideally toward the directness and purposefulness of party government 
and is therefore focused on victory and policy delivery; the former 
points toward a balance of wins and losses and therefore puts an upper 
limit to the pursuit of unilateral victory. But successor democracies—  
such as those established in the West since the war— are likely to 
have special difficulties, which serve well to highlight the 
general problem: What does reconciliation entail and how do you get
there?
The key source of difficulty stems from the probability that next 
to parties unreservedly committed to the democratic bargain (I will 
call them for short democratic parties), a set of forces will appear, 
possibly rallied around their own parties, whose commitment to the 
bargain— owing to their past allegiance to the old regime— is or seems 
to the democratic parties less than certain and unconditional (I will 




























































































democratic parties were alone in the transition to democracy they 
would find it much easier to reconcile party government with the 
notion that wins and losses should be fairly shared. Each party would 
agree that institutional arrangements favoring party government should 
not violate the capacity of prospective oppositions to maintain their 
identity and their interests as they themselves define them.
Further, mutual trust in democratic commitment and awareness that 
institutional arrangements influence outcomes only probabilistically 
would leave the door open for a wide range of tolerable arrangements, 
including those strongly favoring party government and alternance.
But as soon as nostalgic forces and parties are involved in the 
transition the reconciliation above meets a harder test. It is still 
possible to come out of the test successfully; but it is also possible 
that as already indicated in the opening pages— either party government 
or reproducibility will be sacrificed to some extent. The best way 
to appreciate the internal dynamic of any of these outcomes is by 
playing out hypothetically a number of scenarios which 
per se appear to be otherwise "reasonable" (not too easy but not too 
difficult either) for the prospects of democratic transition.^ 1 will
then offer concrete examples.
The presence of nostalgic forces has, first, the effect of con­
fronting the democratic parties with the issue of how much space those 
forces should have in the share of wins and losses. More precisely, 
what confronts the democratic parties is not just a choice between a 




























































































in principle is a dilemma: should the democratic bargain make special
room for nostalgic forces in order to render them safe for democracy, 
or should it cut them totally off in order to make democracy safe from 
its "enemies?"
True, in concrete cases the dilemma may actually have a ready answer.
But even assuming a "reasonable" Scenario as an answer— i.e., the
democratic parties show restraint in the treatment of nostalgic forces,
they ultimately favor national reconciliation, they find the nostalgic forces avail
able for such solution— the scenario still implies some troubling
costs. One cost of special interest from our viewpoint has to do with
the nature of the trade-off that nostalgic forces are likely to seek
for agreeing to democracy. Since these forces include institutions
with a central role in the old regime (fiypical examples are the monarchy,
the military, the church) they are likely to interpret the democratic
bargain in a way that may thwart or distort its authentic meaning. What
they intend to bargain on is not a probabilistic and uncertain share of
■ : *
' t
wins and losses— something more appropriate when the allocation of 
material resources is at stake— but the immediate preservation in no 
uncertain terms of "some" of their exclusive institutional roles. It 
is clear that, beyond a certain point, similar demands may make the 
new regime into a hybrid— a guided democracy of sort; a political market 
that tolerates corporate monopolies of institutions and hence outcomes.
It is also clear that the democratic parties— even if they recognize 
that there is nothing inherent in a monarchy, a military, or a church 
as institutions to prevent them from consenting to democracy— find 




























































































To complicate matters (but still remaining in the realm of the 
"reasonable1'), there is the fact that next to nostalgic ones other 
putatively nondemocratic forces may appear in the transition. I am 
speaking of forces or parties of the extreme left. Let us again over­
look the obviously difficult scenarios: the extreme left pushes for
a pitched battle against nostalgic residues or resists even a 
conventional democratic outcome.^ Let us instead assume that the 
extreme left accepts, and is indeed instrumental in achieving the 
democratic bargain, and let us also assume that it takes a less than 
nastily punitive view of how nostalgic forces should or could be 
handled. Even so, the democratic parties should still reasonably expect 
that the extreme left will never quite rid itself of an ambiguous or 
critical stance toward the actual versus expected accomplishments of 
the democratic transition and will recurrently denounce creeping 
continuismo. And since the extreme left is likely to point to 
continuismo as one major stumbling block in reaching a distribution of 
wins and losses more equitable toward the lower classes, this buttressing 
of economic with civic-institutional criticism may even succeed in 
rubbing at least onto the democratic left. It may variously blackmail 
it or attract it toward forms of political action in common with the 
extreme left (the more so if the democratic left already had its own 
reservations about the treatment of the nostalgic forces). The impor­
tant point to make here is that such common action cannot and at any 
rate will not be considered by other democratic parties (typically a 
large conservative or moderate party) as a garden-variety policy 




























































































an early and recurrent weakness in the institutional bases and there­
fore in the reproducibility of consent.
The reader should notice that I have spoken of common action
between democratic and extreme left; I have not spoken of formal and
stable government coalitions, for the reason that— as I will detail
later— such coalitions do not constitute likely (and reasonable) scenarios.
many things usually divide the two branches of the left, even when
the extreme has been behind the democratic transition, to allow for
18more than emergency government alliances. Yet, if this suggests 
that government coalitions will typically be limited to democratic 
parties, much of what I have said so far also suggests that such 
limitation does not guarantee effective and stable partnership either.
But reasonable complications do not stop here. If the extreme 
left shows suspicion of the nostalgic right, the latter is almost certain 
to reciprocate. In the presence of an extreme left it is therefore fair 
to expect that the nostalgic right will not limit its demands to the 
preservation of some of its institutional roles. Fearful of the extreme 
left's resistance to continuismo— muted as that resistance may be— it may 
demand constraints on the extreme left itself. Even without pushing for 
outright banning of its parties, it may insist on party licensing based 
on ideological-organizational criteria which the extreme left should not 
easily meet; or it may insist on decoupling of party-union ties, controls 
on unions themselves and constraints on bargaining powers and job action—  
all of which would have particularly negative effects on the extreme left. 
And even if the right formulates no specific demands against the extreme 
left— even if it accepts that the same constitutional guarantees be 





























































































we can expect is that the presence of the extreme left will heighten 
the right's circumspection toward the whole process of transition.
It will for instance heighten suspicion toward institutional guarantees 
that will make democracy a "free-for-all." Either way, the same efforts 
made by the extreme left to pull on its side at least the left of the 
democratic parties, will be made by the nostalgic right toward the 
more conservative wing of the same. This too must be seen as a symptom 
if not a cause of an early and recurrent weakness in the institutional 
bases of consent: those bases are likely to be questioned more often,
or to be checked against material outcomes more often.
True, we are far from a scenario in which the extremes are busy
not simply protecting their place in the democratic bargain but arresting
the bargain itself. Also true, since the democratic parties have an implicit
commitment to the bargain, and as long as initially the extremes are
not unconditionally opposed to the same, it is unlikely that— barring
special and unusual circumstances— the pressure exercised by the extremes
on the democratic parties will in short order spell doom for the
democratic experiment. It is unlikely, in other words, that starting
from an original attitude of circumspection the extremes will naturally
and progressively move toward a more unconditional resistance to democracy,
attracting hegemonizing or coercing in the process the democratic parties
19themselves. On the contrary, given the initial scenario I have just 
depicted, time (even in the sheer sense of gaining time) should eventually 
favor a democratic outcome. The mobilization of large sectors of 




























































































crisis of dictatorship, the desire for normalization that follows 
the initial and more uncertain period of transition, and the hard 
reality of prolonged negotiations on the terms of the democratic 
bargain should all work in the same direction: Bolstering the democratic
compromise and in fact inducing the extremes to comply with initially 
feared and unthinkable sacrifices.
In sum, the scenarios I have presented so far are reasonable in 
that they tend toward a progressive narrowing of the options that are 
advanced in the early stages of the transition by a wide spectrum of
20left to right, democratic and putatively nondemocratic political forces. 
And the narrowing occurs around an institutional compromise in the 
negotiation of which the democratic parties play the central role.
Nevertheless, I have also indicated that the compromise involves 
sacrifices by the extremes that go beyond their original inclination—  
sacrifices which the extremes may hold against the democratic parties 
for some time to come, thus subjecting reproducibility to a continuous 
test. Indeed, any extreme progressively drawn by the democratic parties 
into a series of sacrifices is actually in a better position for later 
questioning those sacrifices in terms that the democratic parties 
cannot easily disregard: It can challenge the final compromise on its
own democratic terms, for having thwarted democracy or subjected it to 
exclusive interests and forces, or for threatening its own identity beyond 
tolerance. It can in other words be said that once the inaugural phase 
is over, the more serious test for reproducibility will rarely come from 




























































































alternative to the democratic one. Assuming that they favor it, and 
at least as long as conditions are normal and steady, this is still 
of no direct consequence for the way in which the political game will 
be structured. The serious test will instead come, less dramatically 
but more ambiguously, from within-— as it were— the democratic compromise 
itself.
The foremost task with which the democratic parties are confronted, 
given this initial scenario and its later potential implications, is 
therefore how to alleviate the problem of reproducibility. Everything 
in the scenario, however, suggests that this cannot be easily done by 
drastically disregarding the extremes and freezing them out of the 
democratic compromise. The move would be too risky— the more so the 
more the extremes enjoy popular support and organizational clout— as 
well as being unwarranted by their initial behavior. Thus the democratic 
parties are likely to opt for a more accommodating and less exclusionary 
strategy that, while keeping in place the sacrifices to which the extremes 
have been drawn, will not further limit their ability to survive in some 
reformed way. This is typically done by making institutional garantismo 
the centerpiece of the democratic compromise.
Garantismo is an approach to constitution-making concerned above 
all with making the political market as open and competitive as possible; 
the aim being not to prejudge or load the future wins or losses of anyone 
who abides by its easy entry rules. Prejudgement is checked by the very 
fact of keeping entry qualifications to a minimum, as well as by curbing 




























































































by any institution. The reason why extreme forces should prefer this 
market to a more constrictive one, the nature of whose constrictions 
they are not sure they can control, is obvious. In fact, garantismo 
may be seen as a strategy which democratic parties pursue not just to 
compensate the extremes for previous sacrifices but to induce them 
to those sacrifices— possibly by dividing them internally on the issue.
For example, the prospect of a garantista setup may help a reasonable 
sector of the extreme left to shelve earlier and riskier aspirations 
to a more "advanced" form of democracy. This still does not mean 
that the extreme left will stop questioning the actual democratic 
compromise. There remains the fact that by institutionalizing market 
uncertainty in the utmost garantismo may still be seen by the extremes 
as a mixed and ambivalent solution: because on one side they do not take
instinctively to uncertainty, and because on the other— to the extent 
that it does protect any one extreme— uncertainty also protects its 
opposite. But once garantismo is in place, questioning the democratic 
compromise will appear less credible or urgent. So, if there are reasons 
why the extremes may at least try to attract out and divide the democratic 
parties, there are also reasons why garantismo may stem if not reverse 
the trend. From the viewpoint of the democratic parties garantismo 
has the advantage that it makes the reproduction of consent a recurrent, 
to be sure, but also somewhat more normal activity.
But one direct or indirect cost of garantismo is that it sacrifices 
some of the necessary ingredients of party government— those having to 




























































































incisiveness of policy action. To begin first with the latter, 
garantismo by its own nature tends to deemphasize policy activism and 
institutional choices that go beyond the minimum required to institute 
the mere framework of an open market. In other words, the emphasis is 
on the competitiveness of the market, not on its capacity for delivery. 
Furthermore, there is an incentive for the democratic parties not to 
commit themselves to any institutional choice or policy reform that 
may be interpreted as making them lean heavily in the direction of one 
or the other extreme— i.e., in the direction of "excessive" or "insufficient" 
democratization. By holding the center, so to say, the democratic parties 
maintain their identity as unquestionably democratic parties, affirm 
their preeminent interest in the success of the transition, and strengthen 
their role as the key forces in the transition. In so doing, they also 
and most importantly intend to strengthen and extend their electoral 
appeal at a time when, the dictatorship over, society is almost spon­
taneously mobilized but political alignments are not yet defined.
To repeat, however, all of this carries a cost in governing; the more so 
as, in a last twist, it may be the extremes themselves that, having 
been left with no other immediate options, will finally insist that the 
democratic parties adhere strictly to garantismo (or will even initiate 
a demand for it). Thus, even when the democratic parties, by securing 
their democratic distinctiveness, are returned to government over and 
over again, it will be a rather limited government that they will 
preside over. As parties they may be in government, but as governments 




























































































To understand these points in finer details let us consider the 
matter of constitution-making and the matter of who governs as matters 
of coalition. Garantismo, as the likely outcome of the reasonable 
scenarios I have examined so far, implies cooperative constitutional 
coalitions. It may be the democratic parties that set in motion 
garantismo, or it may be as just suggested the extremes or sectors 
thereof that demand it, or even more likely it may be a bit of both 
(not even historians, or historians least of all, may agree on the 
exact interaction). No matter, the end result is a willy-nilly, formal 
or informal, explicit or implicit, broad and inclusive coalition. And 
broad constitutional coalitions incorporating, even with different 
weights, the extremes have a common denominator to agree upon which 
is minimum indeed: in essence, living together. My remarks above
suggest that— at least with some virtue and leadership and a few 
imponderables— such an agreement should make any one of the following 
three developments more likely. Either the parties of the new democracy, 
though continuing to disagree on the optimal terms of the democratic 
compromise, would put their disagreement on the backbumers. Or parties 
and coalitions advocating a radical and unilateral change in the terms 
of the democratic compromise would not be voted in. Or, when vote 
in, would do less than expected about their promise. And this is as 
it should be for a functioning democracy. That uncertainty— uncertainty 
not just about wins and losses but about the rules for wins and losses 
and the tenure of those rules— does not define democracy. Competition 





























































































But the constrictions:imposed upon government by the agreement to 
live together, an agreement broad in its membership but narrow in its 
terms, are likely to be even greater than that. And they are constric­
tions to which governments will be held by the institutional and coalitional. 
features of that agreement. Central to these features will be a trade­
off of great importance to the extremes and also to the democratic 
parties themselves: on one side a certain unreformed continuity in the
civil and military apparatus of the state,/on the other an accentuated 
parliamentariam revolving around a fully developed party system. Continuity 
in the apparatus of the state (.including possibly but not necessarily 
the preservation of representative institutions like the monarchy) must 
be seen first of all as an aspect of national reconciliation of special 
importance for the nostalgic right. Kept to a minium, as our scenarios 
imply, it involves the maintenance of the essential hierarchical and 
functional structure of that apparatus— in sum the maintenance of its
identity— once specific features added by the dictatorship and patently
21incompatible with the democratic order are removed. But continuity 
may also be seen as a necessity, since changing the apparatus of the state 
is not easy (even for a dictatorship), and since even a democracy must
22rely on some machinery of government, especially in its inaugural phase.
To counter continuity, and more central to the pursuit of garantismo, 
there stands the new system of parties. And here is where the problem 
of governing comes in; for it will not be any system of parties. If it 
is designed by a broad constitutional coalition to begin with, it will 




























































































as possible and to prevent monopolistic situations. Chances are, 
therefore, that access will be regulated by proportional electoral laws, 
that is by laws that are meant to put no obstacles to the self-generation 
of political interests and parties. Chances also are that the party 
system will be placed in the context of accentuated parliamentarism, 
that is of a system structurally designed to make institutional monopolies 
more difficult. In fact, reliance on party-based parliamentarism as 
the centerpiece of garantismo may be such that constitution-making, 
beyond the broad definition of an unconstrained parliamentary system, 
may amount to a very limited affair. For example, the extreme left (at 
least that part which expects substantial electoral support), let alone 
the democratic parties, may at least initially feel that a new open 
unrestrained and in sum fully democratic party system is sufficient to 
circumvent the problem of continuity in the state apparatus. Or the 
parties may feel that nothing more and better can be done, given the 
actual political situation. In either case, little constitutional 
attention will be paid to the issue of how to link the old state, as a 
structure of policy intelligence and implementation, to the new parties. 
Similarly, reliance on the simplified solution of accentuated parlia­
mentarism may lead parties to overlook other forms of garantismo that 
allow competing societal interests more direct entry to a new set of 
countervailing decisional institutions. And as long as constitutional 
efforts will have remained focused on implementing parliamentarism, this 
will have a double effect on governance. First, it will discourage even 




























































































will be so because institutional arrangements will curb the control 
of any electoral majority, even Stable, on the policies of parliament 
and government; but much more because any other majority behavior will 
be denounced by the opposition as a violation of the collective con­
stitutional agreement, and in sum of the strict terms for democratic 
reproducibility. Second, governments will lose coordination with a 
state apparatus whose continuity and potential or suspected indifference 
to democratic governance the new party system was supposed to allay.
And if such coordination is in any form an ingredient of party government, 
then party government will suffer on this score as well.
With this, I have fairly exhausted my treatment of the likely 
implications for governance stemming from a transition to democracy 
in which, 1) the political extremes cannot be discounted, but 2) the 
transition nevertheless converges toward a negotiated democratic solution.
I wish to insist on one point having to do with why the constraints upon 
governance, in particular upon party governance, are likely to be 
greater than those experienced by democracies that either had, as 1 will 
explain later, an "easy" transition from dictatorship or were not born 
from dictatorship. In my opinion, the ultimate reason, or the reason 
that subsumes most of the others, is that the type of "reasonable" 
transitional scenarios I have illustrated involve a process of 
learning: learning the hard way and in especially delicate and constrictive
political conditions what democratic party government is all about, 
what its upper limits are, what it cannot violate. This in turn is the 




























































































above— they best show my point. Another reason is my belief, which
I can only state here, that those scenarios are also the most likely
24ones — though it is not likelihood as much as exemplarity that counts.
New democracies are exemplary and instructive, to return to my intro­
ductory theme, exactly because party government must tread particularly 
difficult waters.
Bearing on this, we must remember that institutional compromises are 
only probabilistically related to outcomes. Strictly speaking, no amount 
of garantismo can absolutely secure the survival of any specific set 
of interests against the will of a democratic majority. Garantismo can 
only build an obstacle course on the way to the formation or implementation 
of that will; it cannot deny its ultimate legality. It is exactly this 
level of uncertainty that our new democracies find uncomfortable. This 
does not mean at all that they will disregard strict institutional 
arrangements. On the contrary, it means that they will tend to surround 
them with all sorts of unwritten and stricter cultural-political expecta­
tions about their proper use. Any violation of such unwritten rules will 
be construed as a violation of the democratic bargain, which may strain 
the reproduction of consent and require a more frequent reassessment of 
its terms. What therefore differentiates our new democracies from, let 
us say, more "established" democracies are two aspects of the democratic 
bargain. First, as stated at the beginning of this section, the latter 
democracies will be able to accommodate a broader range of institutional 
arrangements, including those that favor party government. Second, and 




























































































those arrangements, in which the constraints imposed by the upper norma­
tive limits to party government will be more implicit and internalized, 
and therefore more relaxed.
For example, an established democracy with institutional arrangements 
which are traditionally intended to favor party government (.to exemplify, 
a two-party system, centralized and strongly organized parties with a 
distinctive electorate and ideology, executive dominance over parliament) 
will have no problems putting these arrangements to full and at the same time 
legitimate use in behalf of party government. This is so exactly because 
the expectation is that the use will not violate the upper normative 
limits of party government. But the expectation is not so much based on 
the existence of institutional restraints— which in fact may not even 
exist— as on the implicit and tested certainty that there is no cause 
for anybody to violate those limits. This in turn may allow the politicians 
of such a democracy (in particular, the opposition) to rely with greater 
confidence upon one fact which the politicians of a new democracy may 
deem insufficient, and which scholars have more recently demostrated:
Namely, that there are at any rate structural disincentives and limits, 
other than constitutional, to party government. These are the limits 
I have in part touched upon in the first two pages of this essay and 
which consist, to recap, of the following: That parties are only parts;
that they mediate between complex social formations which have more 
than an input function into politics and a differentiated state which 
does not coincide with parties; that they operate in the context of 




























































































themselves to competing partisan solutions; that they must often play 
down rather than emphasize policy distinctiveness in order to gain 
marginal votes.
Let us finally imagine two democracies— our own new democracy and 
an "established" one— each with institutional arrangements opposite 
to the ones above and thereby presumably limiting party government. Let 
us imagine for instance that both must rely on coalition governments, 
and both lack constitutional devices giving explicit preeminence to the 
executive. It does not take much to surmise that in the established 
democracy the fact of coalitions per se may actually be not at all a 
serious obstacle to a tolerable version of party government— in sum, to 
the ability of coalitions to assemble, deliver or adjust if need be a 
reasonable government program. It is equally understandable that a 
government coalition, and its leader in particular, are not bound to 
interpret the lack of constitutional buttressing of executive powers as 
a legal or, even more, cultural injunction against enforceable majority 
rule. There are no political risks— at least no risks for the reproduction 
of consent— if as a matter of practice that democracy asserts forms of 
party government which institutional arrangements do not expressly 
stipulate (and which at any rate are checked by the structural disincentives 
and limits recalled in the previous paragraph). But could or would 
our new democracy act the same way? Again, the reason for the difference 
is to be found in that uncertainty about the material outcomes of insti­
tutions which one democracy has learned, and which the other is trying 




























































































Or can it? What if the initial scenarios had been different?
The answer is rather straightforward: since it is always reproducibility 
that determines whether party government is affordable, and since 
reproducibility hinges on the presence and role of the extremes, 
they must be scenarios where the extremes create no problem for the 
reproduction of interests and thus of consent. I can think of two 
such scenarios. But I can also think of one scenario where— on the 
contrary— an early push toward party government, in the absence of the 
appropriate normative conditions, undermines reproducibility.
The first scenario is self-explanatory. There will be no issue 
of reproducibility and no obstacle to party government— almost by
definition— if the political extremes are initially weak and politically
25 ’disqualified, and therefore easily discountable. Because the scenario “
is an easy and indeed not very interesting one, I will not further dwell
on it. What deserves understanding is not so much what its outcomes
are, as much as what the conditions are that make the extremes weak
and politically ineffective. And this can be illustrated to greater
advantage through a concrete example to be offered in the next section.
But let us now suppose that the political extremes, instead of being 
weak and politically ineffective, are so prominent that they and not the 
democratic parties (as in the scenario with which we started) hold initially 
center stage in the transition. Ostensibly, we are no longer dealing 
with an ea'sy scenario, to say the least. Is party government, in fact 
democracy itself, eventually possible? The answer is always the same 




























































































the main burden of the transition, take as their chief task the creation 
of the institutional conditions for reproducing consent; if in sum they 
cease to be extremes, except by some external labeling we attach to 
them. Contrariwise, any early effort to impose and give precedence 
to party government would backfire, in more ways than if the same 
strategy had been used by democratic parties. To put it in stronger 
terms, what I am willing to argue (and show) is that scenarios 
dominated by the extremes can and do produce the worst but also the 
best possible outcome for democracy.
To begin with the latter outcome, let me take the case of what we 
have labeled the nostalgic right (the reason why I have chosen the right 
rather than the extreme left will become apparent later). In the 
scenario dominated by the democratic parties I have presented the 
behavior of the nostalgic right as indeed largely nostalgic, if not 
exactly inimical to democracy: compromising willy-nilly, stalling,
blackmailing, and in sum dragging along at best. But this is just one 
scenario. Some of the remarks I made in the previous section suggest as 
well that there is no a priori reason why the nostalgic right— that 
is, forces in the coalition that made up the dictatorship— should remain 
cohesively nostalgic, that the right is not nostalgic by definition and 
in toto but by the structure of opportunities, and that dictatorships 
can be as expendable as democracies are. It is conceptually quite 
unwarranted to take the interests of the nostalgic right as fixed and 
unshakeable when we know that the demise of dictatorial regimes has 




























































































coalition. And to argue that secessions serve the purpose of saving
the old interests begs the question of how such goal can be achieved.
Besides, intentions do not count here: Strictly speaking, saving old
interests through a new regime is an impossibility, since the structures
of a regime affect and hence define/redefine the interests served.
To say the least, and for reasons that need no restatement, there is
no guarantee that old interests be preserved if the new regime happens
to be a democracy. To be sure, that is why forces seceding from the
dictatorship may wish to arrest the process of liberalization they
have put in motion before it reaches the democratic threshold. But
26there are circumstances— which is not my task to analyze here — under 
which those forces may propel liberalization up to and past the 
democratic threshold. When this happens, then something else is likely ». 
to happen.
If and because it has undertaken the path to democracy, the seceding 
right (in a way the right more than any other political force) should 
understand two things about the successful management of transition.
First, a new democracy is rarely established by unilateral action. At 
one point or another, even assuming original unilateral action, pressures 
for broader founding coalitions will be brought to bear by newly mobilized 
groups that variously look at the dictatorship as morally abhorrent, 
economically unviable, politically exhausted, or just plainly expendable 
and incidental. Second, of all the forces that may set in motion the 
transition to democracy the one that can least disregard the importance 




























































































bargain is precisely the right. For one thing, this being almost
always a seceding right, it will find it difficult to assert itself
over that part of the right that remains nostalgic or undecided,
unless it seeks the support of emerging democratic forces. For
another, and more important, since these forces have good reasons
to suspect the motives and the commitment of the seceding right,
nothing short of deeds explicitly demonstrating that commitment will
buy that support. The most obvious deeds, and possibly the easiest,
are politico/institutional: putting no obstacle to the ability of
forces that play by the rules to enter the political'market; while
avoiding institutional arrangements that may be interpreted as stacking
outcomes in favor of the right. In sum, once a seceding right embarks
not merely on liberalization but democratization, the path must be
27travelled to its political end.
All of this sounds very much like garantismo. But the point I
wish to make is that— exactly because what is first at stake in the
transition is the transfer of consent from dictatorship to democracy—
garantismo initiated by the right itself has a double advantage over
one initiated by forces that always opposed the dictatorship. First,
it is a more complete antidote against fears of continuismo. Second,
and reciprocally, it offers a larger basis of consent for the new
democracy and its new political forces. It allows, in sum, what I
have elsewhere called a mutual "forward/backward" legitimation of
democratic forces on one hand, and of reformed forces formerly in the




























































































constitutional coalition that makes this possible may be broad enough 
to embrace even forces that we would conventionally assign to the 
extreme left, but find important pay-offs in the collective implementa­
tion of garantismo.
Finally, the realization of such a scenario has the ultimate effect 
of removing normative obstacles to party government. It is exactly 
broad agreement on the institutional compromise that, by building 
stronger foundations for the reproduction of interests and consent, 
should make this last achievement possible. In sum, though garantismo 
as pursued by the democratic parties in the first scenario is still 
an impediment to party government, here garantismo should have the 
opposite effect: Once again, what preliminarily counts in making or
breaking party government are not institutions and instrumentalities per 
se, as much as their cultural underpinning and the collective expectations 
about their proper use.
Besides, the constitutional strategy used by the seceding right should 
also favor the formation of a party spectrum and party alignments conducive 
to government competition between left and right coalitions. The 
seceding right, in order to firmly differentiate itself from the rest 
of the right, will tend to converge toward the more moderate sectors 
of the forces opposed to the dictatorship. By the same token, its 
constitutional behavior will make it easier for the moderate sectors 
to look at the seceding right as a potential government ally, or may 
even lead to the formation of parties or federations of parties combining 




























































































convergence may operate, since the constitutional behavior of the 
right should variously weaken the reservations of the extreme left 
about the terms of the institutional compromise, increase the risks 
of more dissenting strategies, or divide the extreme left on these 
issues. None of this means that there will be no real extreme left 
and no real nostalgic right to resist, oppose, denounce or resent the 
democratic compromise. But it does mean that the new party spectrum 
should leave them little political space and leverage— too little for 
these forces to prevent the rest of the parties from taking a turn 
at party government.
But what if, instead of the reformed right or the democratic 
parties, it is the extreme left to take the prominent lead in the 
transition; and what if it goes for a more progressive democracy— one 
that would not be confined to a mere political shell but would place 
group and class relations on a more "advanced" basis and do away with 
continuismo? Reasons why the extreme left would be persuaded to follow 
such a scenario are not lacking. The very fact of enjoying an initial 
lead with respect to the other forces would give the extreme left addi­
tional power and drive. It would also give it a sense of potentially 
expanding authority and support and hence a sense that everything is 
possible. After all, if the extreme left is in the lead, it must appear 
to be so, in the initial exhilaration of liberation, because the right 
(and perhaps not the right alone) is morally, politically and economically 




























































































initial advantages, even the democratic left may be attracted by 
the prospects of a more radical democratization— or may choose or be 
drawn into a more stable and exclusive coalition with the extreme left.
What would then be the likely implications of this initial scenario
for reproducibility and party government? The answer should by now be
clear a contrario from everything I have said in this section, and I
offer it less for demonstration than for completeness. Let us assume
that the initial drive by the left will in fact catch the right in
disarray and will therefore meet no immediate resistance capable of
setting the clock back. The result, as Guillermo O'Donnell has
described it, will be a process of rapid and purposive democratization
31that will go well beyond the strictly political dimension. The 
process will have three distinctive components of importance for our 
analysis.
First, it will tend to give first priority to policy content— that 
is, to ambitious reform policies in the realm of social and economic 
relations and institutions— as the best strategy to prevent a resurgence 
of the past and to expand and consolidate popular consent. Second, it 
will tend to soft-pedal a conventionally competitive constitutional 
framework and prefer politico/institutional arrangements intended to 
keep in place, monitor and carry forward those reforms. In principle, 
institutional arrangements should vary considerably as to the locus of 
monitoring and leadership they favor— from forms of producers' autogestion 
to select local and national juntas supervising or replacing competitively- 




























































































ray opinion, fears of reactionary coups and the cumbersomeness of 
dispersed autogestion should sooner or later push the left toward the 
latter arrangements (thus making the new regime a borderline case of 
democracy at best). And the push will be stronger if, of the two wings 
of the left it is the extreme that prevails. Third, in the drive 
toward policy reforms and constitutional guidance (an approach quite 
different from garantismo), the left is likely to shun political and 
constitutional coalitions with more moderate sectors of the party 
spectrum as tactically unnecessary, programmatically stifling and 
ideologically improper.
Pursuing these three components means in effect pursuing some 
of the behavioral and instrumental conditions of part government: The
directness of its policies; the homogeneity of the governing forces 
selecting them; the constitutional preeminence of these forces over, 
or at least their circumvention of, the state's implementing apparatus 
on one side and representative institutions and oppositions on the 
other. But it also means getting dangerously close, to say the least, 
to a violation of the normative limits of party government. The left
I.
will not look at the constitutional mechanisms it has constructed as 
mechanisms to be interchangeably used by its adversaries, were they to 
become the government; it will not see party government as only govern­
ment by parts, and limited in time; it will not take favorably to 
uncertainty in institutional outcomes (an uncertainty which reforms 
were supposed to remove); and even if it settles for a raore^conventional 




























































































from coming into government, it will not consider the new majority as 
being entitled to repeal or alter the reforms it has introduced, since 
they define the new order. Yet those reforms will have been introduced 
by a select majority if any, as well as for the purpose of stifling the 
reproduction of conservative interests beyond limits that those interests 
may find intolerable.
Most prominent among those interests, but not alone, will be the
interest of the state apparatus to manage itself internally and
capitalism's interest in accumulation. And since it is far from
likely that, despite the initial advantage of the left, the reforms
will be sufficient to make those interests disappear in thin air,
the scenario's likely outcome in the short to middle range is the
emergence of what O'Donnell calls a situation of dual power,.and naked
32at that. Let us assume that this dual situation will not lead to an 
abrupt or violent resolution, through destabilizing subscenarios that 
require little fantasy to envision. Even so, government and opposition 
will continue to compete on issues that touch upon the very structure
of the new regime. And if the threatened interests find eventually
}
their way to government, and if they revoke what the left has done, it
is difficult to predict a long and safe journey for the new democracy—





























































































A PREVIEW OF THE REMAINDER OF THE PAPER
There will be two more briefer sections to the paper. The first 
section will examine new democracies that exemplify the scenarios 
above. As much as possible, the analysis will go beyond the period 
of transition to examine the very crucial problem of how long the 
effects of the transition on reproducibility and party government 
last. Obviously, none of the concrete cases to be examined fit 
perfectly any of the scenarios, though the informed reader has no 
difficulty discovering that the scenarios have been abstracted from 
reality. It will be one task of this section to point out deviations 
from each scenario and relative implications.
The case that comes closer to the first and most instructive
»
scenario, the scenario of garantismo, is postfascist Italy— and the 
consequences of that scenario on party government and reproducibility 
are still felt today. West Germany, on the other hand, best fits the 
"easy" scenario, making the extremes discountable and favoring in that 
sense party government. Spain and Portugal in the seventies serve to
illustrate the two opposite outcomes of transitions initiated by;
the extremes— the former acting to transform the extremes into key 
components of the collective democratic compromise, the latter leading 
from prematurely installed party government to a crisis of reproducibility. 
More ambiguous, finally, is the case of Greece in the seventies. The 




























































































shortness and unconsolidated nature of the dictatorship made possible 
a democratic inauguration at the hands of a predictatorship and non- 
nostalgic right which, beyond compelling the democratic left to 
compete within rules of the right's choosing (essentially an electoral 
law with majority premium and a strong executive leadership) did 
little else to prevent the reproducibility of the left's social and 
economic interests. Though we have here some of the instrumentalities 
of party government, the real question about its normative viability 
comes with the left's electoral victory. Can the newly acquired power 
and the instrumentalities provided originally by the right be used— and 
how far— to set the democratic bargain on a more "advanced" basis?
The second section will look at new democracies' prospects for 
party government in the light of today's alleged crisis of the latter.
I will examine only one aspect of that crisis: the inability of
welfare democracies run by competing parties to reconcile welfare with 
capitalist accumulation. I will argue three points. First, the most 
prominent normative limit to party government does come from the need 
to reproduce the interests of capital. In simple words, we are dealing 
with capitalist democracies and the parties replacing each other in 
government are kept to this parameter. Second, the success of new 
democracies is based exactly on collective consent to the reproduction 
of capital. But consent means above all consent by the left in exchange, 
reciprocally, for the protection of its own interests as the left 
defines them (that is why new democracies inaugurated by the extreme 
left may run the highest risks). Hence, where this reciprocal legitima­
tion has not occurred, party government is less likely (or riskier).




























































































more difficult to achieve, because of the stumbling block represented 
by the left, are also less capable to redefine collectively, when 
necessary, the institutions through which the reproduction of 
interests and consent is sought (for instance, by inserting neocorporatist 
arrangements).
Implicit in all of this is the notion that neocorporatist arrangements 
or any arrangements designed to improve reproducibility do not exactly 






























































































^This is the opening line of "Founding Coalitions in Southern 
Europe: Legitimacy and Hegemony," Government and Opposition, 15
(Spring 1980), pp. 162-189.
2The distinction between parties in government and party government 
is in Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), p. 19. For the notion of variability in party 
government see Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government: A
Theoretical and Empirical Critique," Political Studies, 17 (1969), 
pp. 413-445.
3Ibid., p. 414.
4 4Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? (Chatham, N.J.:
Chatham House, 1980), p. 156.
3The distinction between changes in personnel, policies and 
structures and its implications for patterns of government and opposition 
are discussed by Robert Dahl in Robert Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions 
in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Chapter 11.
^This is Rose's conclusion in "Variability," cit. For a less stringent 
assessment of the English case see Rose, Do Parties, cit.
^An elegant demonstration is in Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems




























































































for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," Woodrow Wilson
Center, Washington, D.C., September 1980).
9Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970), chap. 1.
^This does not mean that such actors, once they enter into the 
bargain, may not engage in a contest over the exact definition of the 
bargain. But the contest will be time-bound. It will not be resumed 
unless, as indicated in the text, a tolerable range of expected outcomes 
is violated.
■^We like to think of democracy as fragile. It is time to reflect 
on the internal fragility of nondemocratic orders as well. Along 
these lines see recently Philippe Schmitter, "Speculations about the 
Prospective Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and Its Possible Consequences" 
(Conference on the "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule," Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., September 1980).
12On democracy as an institutional compromise see Adam Przeworski,
"Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System,"
;in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., Political Power and Social Theory (Greenwich:
JAI Press, 1980), Vol. 1, pp. 21-66.
13There are also crises in which parties are not centrally or 
initially involved in the inauguration of democracy, because democracy 
is mainly Imposed by an occupying power or octroyee by a monarch, 
a military dictator, or similar. And there are cases when democracy 




























































































by slow transformation. These, however, are cases less suited to 
illustrate my point about the affordability of party government and 
are therefore not analyzed here.
14By successor democracies I mean democracies that follow an 
authoritarian or totalitarian regime.
One easy criterion— though possibly too narrow, as we will see—  
is that these parties opposed the dictatorship during its life, and 
opposed it in the name of democracy and no other order.
■^In other words, easy and difficult scenarios hold no special 
interest in that they overdetermine outcomes: either a successful
democracy with no problems stemming from its inauguration, or a short­
lived democracy, if any. Reasonable scenarios, instead, are much more 
open and uncertain in their outcomes. Therefore they illustrate better 
what it takes to reach (or miss} that delicate balance which the 
democratic bargain implies.
■^The difficulty is not just in the fact that the extreme left 
favors something quite different from the other political forces, but 
in the fact that it does this against other forces which are by no means 
insignificant.
18This is even truer when the alliance is between the extreme 
left and all the democratic parties.
19The scenario of such involution will not be analyzed further. 
Object of the paper is not the failure of democratic inauguration 





























































































21This may require a limited purge of bureaucratic personnel 
and the repeal of external decision-making authority violating democratic 
accountability. Also, reforms may have to be deeper in the case of the 
judicial system.
22This may explain why democracy may preserve institutions created 
by the dictatorship for state intervention in the economy.
23I will discuss later on, but more briefly, a scenario in which 
some parties are willing to take greater, though not necessarily 
destructive, risks in the direction of party government. It will show 
my point a contrario— by what the reproduction of consent stands to 
lose.
My claim cannot be proven or disproved by counting cases of 
democratic transition: they are only unrepresentative instances of
a potentially infinite population. As to the criticism that my 
scenarios allow for too large a number of variations, I would argue 
that most variations still revolve around the search for negotiated 
outcomes and tend to have closely related effects on governance.
25I am aware that these are very gross categories, but I am afraid 
that finer ones would take us quite afar without greatly improving predic 





























































































2 6°Those circumstances have been analyzed recently in Schmitter, 
"Speculations," cit.
27A similar scenario would apply to a seceding left imitating the 
democratization of a leftist dictatorship (for example, a people's 
democracy), though I can think of some points of significant difference.
28Assuming always that the right is present and with similar weight. 
If the political and numerical weight of the right is insignificant 
or nil the scenario is obviously much easier.
Di Palma, "Founding Coalitions," cit.
30It can be said more in general that transitions to democracy 
almost always place the extreme left or the left as a whole in the 
position to claim moral and political superiority. On the contrary, 
even a seceding right that initiates democratization must always prove 
itself.
31Guillermo O'Donnell, "Notas Para el Estudio de Procesos de 
Democratization Politica a Partir del Estado Burocratico-Autoritario" 
(CEDES, Buenos Aires, January 1980, mimeo).
33Unless, that is, the new government— aware of the risks of 
plainly setting back the clock— chooses to negotiate its way through 
a renewed constitutional process. The process would have to balance 
a limited step back on reforms with constitutional guarantees that would 
keep the democratic game open. In essence, it would be a lateral move 
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